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Abstract 
Population-ageing is one of the traditional topics of development and growth theory and a key 
challenge to most modern societies. We focus on the following aspect: Population-ageing is 
associated with changes in demand-structure, since demand-patterns change with increasing age. 
This process induces structural changes (factor-reallocations across technologically heterogeneous 
sectors) and, thus, has impacts on average productivity growth. We provide a neoclassical multi-
sector growth-model for analyzing these aspects and elaborate potential policy-impact channels. 
We show that ageing has permanent and complex/multifaceted impacts on the growth rate of the 
economy and could, therefore, be an important determinant of long-run GDP-growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Population-ageing – a term which in general refers to an increasing life span of an 
average member of a society – is one of the key stylized facts of the development 
process. It has had and will have some major impacts on economic and social 
structures in developing and industrialized economies. This fact is reflected by a 
large body of literature dealing with it. Well known examples of this literature are 
development and growth theories related to population growth, e.g. classical 
theories (like Malthusian development traps) and neoclassical growth theory 
(ranging from Solow-model to endogenous-growth theories), and most obviously 
theories of social security and pension systems. As well, these aspects are 
associated with actual policy making, including development policy (World 
Bank, UN, etc), population policy (e.g. in China), and major changes in pension 
and health systems in some industrialized economies. A very general discussion 
of population-ageing is provided by IMF (2004). The focus of our paper is on 
economic growth. (To some extent our paper has implications for pension 
systems as well). For an extensive discussion of models dealing with ageing and 
economic growth see, e.g., Gruescu (2007); for a short, but still very 
comprehensive, discussion see, e.g., Mc Morrow and Röger (2003). An overview 
of empirical studies is provided by, e.g., Groezen et al. (2005). 
 
1.1 Focus of our paper 
In this paper we focus on an impact channel of ageing which seems to be rarely 
studied in this literature (at least there seems to be a shortage of theoretical 
models which analyze it): the impacts of ageing-induced demand-shifts on factor-
allocation across technologically distinct sectors and their consequences for GDP-
growth. Our results have also implications for old-age-pension-funding, since 
GDP is the basis for funding the pension systems. The working hypothesis is the 
following: An increase in the relative share of the “old” in an economy changes 
the structure of aggregate demand, since the “old” have a different structure of 
demand in comparison to the “young”. If there are some differences in 
technologies between sectors which produce the goods for the old and sectors 
which produce the goods for the young some effects on aggregate productivity 
growth and, thus, on GDP-growth and pension-to-output-ratios may arise. (We 
name this whole line of arguments “factor-allocation-effects of ageing”). In 
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other words, ageing may induce “structural change” (i.e. cross-technology factor-
reallocation), hence causing changes in aggregate (or: average) productivity 
growth. Thus, the increasing old-age pension payments (due to the increasing 
number of recipients) are confronted with changes in the growth rate of the tax-
base, which may require changes in the old-age-pension system. 
This line of arguments seems to be quite obvious, especially when thinking of 
services, like health care services and geriatric nursing services: in general, the 
“old” demand more of such services in comparison to the “young”; furthermore, 
the “production process” of these services is regarded to be technologically 
distinct (i.e. relatively labour-intensive) in comparison to e.g. manufacturing 
goods (see also IMF (2004), chapter 3, and especially p. 159). However, there are 
also some other differences in demand between the old and the young, e.g. the 
young have a relatively larger demand for commodities and investment goods 
(e.g. housing, car and furniture, i.e. things which the old may already have). 
Furthermore, in general, the old seem to spend a larger share of budget on 
services (see Groezen et al. (2005)). 
 
1.2 Related empirical evidence 
Empirical evidence on such differences in demand patterns between the old and 
the young and their growing importance (not only for factor reallocation across 
sectors) has been presented by, e.g., Börsch-Supan (1993, 2003), Fuchs (1998) 
and Fougère et al. (2007). Furthermore, empirical evidence implies that there are 
strong differences in technology across products/sectors (e.g. when comparing 
some services and manufactured products or health care services and 
commodities production): Evidence on differences in TFP-growth across 
sectors/products is provided by, e.g., Baumol et al. (1985) and Bernard and Jones 
(1996). Evidence on differences in capital intensities across sectors is provided 
by, e.g., Close and Schulenburger (1971), Kongsamut et al. (1997), Gollin (2002), 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008). Nordhaus 
(2008) presents some evidence on the relevance of cross-sector reallocations for 
aggregate growth.1 Overall, this (partly indirect) evidence on factor-allocation-
                                                 
1 Further references on the relationship between structural change and growth are: Robinson 
(1971), Madisson (1987), pp.666ff, Dowrick and Gemmel (1991), Bernard and Jones (1996), 
Broadberry (1997,1998), Foster et al. (1998), Berthélmy and Söderling (1999), Poirson (2000), 
Caselli and Coleman (2001), Temple (2001), Disney et al. (2003), Penderer (2003), Broadberry 
and Irwin (2006), UN (2006), Restuccia et al. (2008) and Duarte and Restuccia (2010). 
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effects of ageing seems to provide sufficient incentive to take a look at their 
relevance from a theoretical perspective. 
 
1.3 Related theoretical literature 
Our model is related to the theoretical literature which postulates the importance 
of cross-sector technology-differences for GDP-growth, e.g. Baumol (1967) and 
Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). Baumol (1967) claims that cross-sector 
differences in (labour-)productivity-growth can cause (by themselves) a GDP-
growth-slowdown via relative price changes (“Baumol’s cost disease”). However, 
Baumol (1967) does not analyze (ageing-induced) demand-shifts, and he makes 
as well some simplifying assumptions (e.g. he excludes capital accumulation), 
which may be not accurate for our goals as we will see later. Acemoglu and 
Guerrieri (2008) show that cross-sector differences in capital-intensities have an 
impact on aggregate growth. However, they as well do not include (ageing-
induced) demand-shifts into their analysis. Furthermore, Rausch (2006) provides 
a two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin model with ageing, where ageing leads to an 
increase in the savings rate, since the old have relatively larger amounts of assets. 
He argues that ageing leads to changes in the relative sector-size (and, thus, in 
GDP-growth), provided that sectors differ by capital intensity (see Rausch (2006), 
pp. 20 ff.). He as well does not take account of the impacts of ageing-induced 
demand-shifts. 
To our knowledge, the model by Groezen et al. (2005) is the only one which 
explicitly includes ageing-induced demand-shifts into analysis, where ageing is 
incorporated into a two-sector overlapping-generations model. The old consume 
the output of a “backward” services sector; this sector uses labour-input only and 
does not have any productivity growth. The young consume the output of a 
“progressive” commodities sector; this sector uses capital and labour as input 
factors and generates capital and endogenous technological progress which 
increases its productivity with time. Groezen et al. (2005) focus on the trade-off 
between the positive “savings-effect of longevity”2 and the negative “factor-
                                                 
2 This savings-effect works as follows: An increase in longevity implies more saving for 
retirement. An increase in savings is associated with additional generation of capital and 
technological progress. Thus, factors are reallocated to the commodities sector (since this sector 
generates capital and technological progress). 
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allocation-effects of ageing”3. They show the importance of the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour in the progressive sector. If this elasticity 
is equal to unity, the two effects offset each other and ageing has no impacts on 
growth in their model. However, if this elasticity is greater (smaller) than unity, 
ageing has a negative (positive) impact on growth.4 
 
1.4 Model setup 
In contrast to Groezen et al. (2005), we do not study the trade-off between 
“savings-effect” and “factor-allocation-effect”, but focus on a detailed and in 
some sense “more general” study of the “factor-allocation-effect”.5 We are able to 
provide a detailed discussion of the factor-reallocations and the “factor-
allocation-effect (without simulations), because our paper is rooted in the “new” 
structural change literature, which is pioneered by Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001), 
Ngai and Pissarides (2007) and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). This literature 
focuses on neoclassical structural change modelling (capital accumulation and 
intertemporal utility maximization) and the usage of (partially) balanced growth 
paths (PBGPs). Especially, PBGPs facilitate the dynamic analysis significantly; 
see also the discussion in section 5.5. 
Our model is a sort of disaggregated Ramsey-model6 where the representative 
household(s) consume(s) two groups of goods: “senior-goods” (i.e. goods which 
are primarily consumed by “older” people) and “junior-goods” (i.e. goods which 
are primarily consumed by younger people). Ageing (i.e. an increasing ratio of 
old-to-young) yields an increasing weight of senior-needs in the aggregate utility 
function, hence leading to a demand-shift in direction of senior-goods. We 
assume that the production of senior-goods and the production of junior-goods 
differ by TFP-growth and by capital-intensity (i.e. output-elasticity of inputs), 
according to the empirical evidence discussed above. Moreover, we include 
intermediates production into the model; this allows for linkages between senior- 
and junior-goods-production, which have been stated to be important by Fougère 
                                                 
3 The factor-allocation-effect has been described in section 1.1. In the Groezen-et-al.-(2005)-
model this effect works as follows: ageing shifts factors to the “backward” services sector, since 
the “old” consume services only; thus, aggregate labour-productivity is lowered. 
4 A paper, which is to some extent related to this topic, since it deals with ageing-related choice of 
technology, is provided by Irmen (2009). 
5 In fact, the sort of “savings effect”, which is modelled by Groezen et al. (2005), does not exist in 
our model. 
6 For discussion of the standard (one-sector) Ramsey-model, see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(2004). 
 6
et al. (2007) and by Kuhn (2004); see also the discussion at the end of Section 
2.2. 
 
1.5 Model results 
Overall, our results imply that the factor-allocation-effects of ageing on GDP-
growth are “complex” (or: “multifaceted”), i.e. they are dependent on many 
parameters, consisting of several channels and potentially non-monotonous over 
time. 
Furthermore, they seem to be very significant, from the theoretical point of view, 
since even a one-time increase in the old-to-young ratio causes permanent (non-
transitory) impacts on the GDP-growth-rate. Thus, ageing seems to be an 
important determinant of GDP-growth. 
For a more detailed summary of our results and their implications see section 5; 
especially, see section 5.4 for a comparison of our results to previous literature. 
 
1.6 Setup of the paper 
The rest of the paper is set up as follows: In sections 2 and 3 we present the 
assumptions and the solution of our model. In section 4 we analyze the impacts of 
ageing: first, we describe the dynamics of the equilibrium without ageing (section 
4.1); subsequently, we compare this equilibrium to the equilibrium with ageing, 
where we present a simpler version of the model in section 4.2 (where only cross-
sector-differences in TFP-growth exist) and the more sophisticated version of the 
model in section 4.3. Finally, we make some concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
2. Model assumptions 
2.1 Utility 
We assume an economy where two groups of goods exist: “junior-goods” (goods 
mi ,...1= ) and “senior-goods” (goods ),...1 nmi += . The representative household 
consumes a mix of these goods and maximizes the following life-time utility 
function (in the following we omit the time-indices): 
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where iC  stands for consumption of good i and ρ  is the time-preference rate. N  
is an index of overall-population (including the young and the old) growing at 
constant exogenous rate; L  is an index of the young (working) population 
growing at constant exogenous rate. Hence, the ratio NL /  is an index of the 
share of the young as part of overall population, and a decreasing NL /  can be 
interpreted as ageing.  
The utility function is based on the Stone-Geary-preferences, where the iθ s can 
be respectively interpreted as the subsistence levels (if iθ  > 0) or as levels of 
home-production (if iθ  < 0). The income-elasticity of demand differs across 
goods; the price-elasticity of demand differs across goods as well and is not equal 
to unity. (See also Kongsamut et al (1997, 2001) for a discussion of a similar 
utility function.) 
In fact, this utility function introduces ageing-induced demand shifts in the 
simplest way. The utility function implies that ageing (a decreasing NL / ) makes 
the consumption of senior-goods relatively more contributing to aggregate utility, 
and, as we will see later, this leads to a shift of demand towards senior-goods. In 
order to focus on the effects of ageing we introduce the restrictions (5a) and (5b). 
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In this way we ensure that there are no other shifts in demand between the junior 
and senior sector, beside of those induced by ageing (a decreasing NL / ): 
Provided that NL /  is constant (no ageing), the demand for senior-goods and the 
demand for junior-goods grow at the same rate, yielding no factor reallocations 
between the senior- and the junior-sector. (Nevertheless, there are still demand 
shifts and reallocations within these sectors, due to the iθ s.) 
Alternatively, the functions Ju  and Su  could be assumed to be of type Cobb-
Douglas or CES. We chose Stone-Geary-preferences, since in this way we can 
add additional sources of demand-shifts (others than ageing) by omitting the 
restriction (5a) and (5b). This will be of importance later. 
Note that there is a difference between demand-shifts which are modelled in 
standard structural change theory (e.g. in the paper by Kongsamut et al. (2001)) 
and ageing-induced demand shifts which are modelled in our paper. In standard 
structural change theory demand shifts are caused by differences in income-
elasticity of demand across goods. Hence, some repercussions arise: changes in 
income -> demand shifts -> productivity impacts-> changes in income and so on. 
This repercussion does not arise in our model. In our model the chain of impacts 
is rather only in one direction: (income–independent) exogenous change in old-to-
young ratio -> demand shifts -> productivity impacts -> change in income. Of 
course, one could postulate that changes in income are associated with changes in 
old-to-young ratio to some extent (e.g. due to improvement in medicine or do to 
some change in socio-cultural parameters which are associated with increasing 
income). This would imply that changes in the old-to-young ratio are endogenous. 
Although we believe that this is an interesting topic in general, a model with 
endogenous old-to-young ratio would yield very similar results as the standard 
structural change theory. The only difference would be that there is a further link 
in the chain of impacts: income-change -> change in old-to-young ratio -> 
demand shifts -> productivity impacts -> income-change and so on. 
Therefore, we can summarize this discussion as follows: Ageing seems to cause 
productivity-impacts via demand-shifts in two ways: On the one hand, it acts 
similar like income-elasticity-differences across goods. This sort of impact is 
modelled implicitly in standard structural change theory. On the other hand, 
ageing acts like an exogenous, income-independent shift in demand. This sort of 
impact is modelled in our paper. Hence, in our model we assume that ageing 
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arises due to some (from economist’s point of view) exogenous changes. For 
example, some socio-cultural parameters change (e.g. change in religiosity, 
emancipation) and/or some progress in medicine occurs independently of income 
level. Of course both factors depend on the income of a country to some extent; 
however, they must have some income-independent timely component. 
Note that we are not the only ones, who model ageing as exogenous shifts in 
demand. For example, Groezen et al. (2005) model it in this way too. Overall, 
there seems to be a research gap in this field, which may be interesting to fill. 
 
2.2 Production 
According to the evidence discussed above, the senior-goods are not produced by 
the same technology as junior-goods; the technologies differ by TFP-growth and 
by output-elasticities of inputs (i.e. capital intensities differ between the senior- 
and the junior-sector). Furthermore, we assume that only the young supply labour 
on the market; hence L (and not N) is input in production: 
 
(7) miZzKkLlAY iiii ,...1,)()()( == γβα  
(8) nmiZzKkLlBY iiii ,...1,)()()( +== μνχ  
(9) BA gB
Bg
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where iY  denotes the output of sector i; K  denotes the aggregate stock of capital; 
Z  is an index of intermediate inputs; ii kl ,  and iz  denote respectively the fraction 
of labour, capital and intermediates devoted to sector i; A  and B  are exogenous 
technology parameters, where we assume that TFP-growth differs between the 
junior- and the senior-sector. 
We assume that each sector’s output is consumed and used as intermediate input 
)( ih ; only sector-m-output is used as capital:  
 
(11) mihCY iii ≠∀+= ,  
(12) KKhCY mmm δ+++= &  
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where δ  is the depreciation rate of capital. Provided that it is assumed that 
senior-goods are rather services, the assumption that only the junior-sector 
produces capital seems to be consistent with empirical evidence which states that 
nearly all capital goods are produced by the manufacturing sector (see e.g. 
Kongsamut et al. (1997, 2001)). 
The intermediate-inputs-index )(Z  is a Cobb-Douglas function of sectoral 
intermediate outputs ( ih ): 
 
(13) ∑∏
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=∀<<=
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ii
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i
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11
1,10,)( εεε  
 
This intermediate structure is the same as the one assumed by Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007). Note that it is important to assume intermediates production within this 
model. In general, we can assume that the old and the young consume many 
goods which are nearly the same. (However, the manner of consumption is quite 
different.) For example, the young and the old consume food. However, while 
probably many young cook the food by themselves, some very old consume the 
food by being served in retirement homes or hospitals. Hence, although the old 
and the young eat similar things, the share of services is larger in the consumption 
of the old. If we did not assume some intermediate linkages between the junior 
and senior consumption goods we would not take account for the fact that the old 
are the same human beings as the young (i.e. having the same basic needs). For 
example, the assumption that the old and the young consume different goods 
(which have no intermediate linkages) would e.g. imply that the old do not eat 
food. It would not be necessary to take account for these facts if intermediates 
production were irrelevant for the ageing-effects. However, as we will see, the 
output-elasticities of intermediate inputs determine among others the strength of 
the ageing impacts via structural change. Hence, we have to include intermediate 
linkages between senior-goods and junior-goods into our model. 
All labour, capital and intermediate inputs are used in production, i.e. 
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2.3 Numéraire 
Let ip  denote the price of good i. We choose the output of sector m as numéraire. 
Hence, 
 
(15a) 1=mp  
 
It should be noted here that in reality real GDP is calculated by using an average 
price as GDP-deflator; i.e. in general, a basket of all goods which have been 
produced is used as numéraire. (See also Ngai and Pissarides (2007), p. 435, and 
Ngai and Pissarides (2004), p. 21.) We choose the manufacturing output as 
numéraire, since in this way we can analyze the equilibrium growth paths in the 
most convenient manner. Nevertheless, we will always calculate the GDP by 
using an average price deflator as well. We use the following compound deflator, 
which may be regarded as the theoretical mirror image of the deflators which are 
used to calculate real GDP in reality:  
 
(15b) ∑
=
≡
n
i
i
N
N
ii p
Y
Ypp
1
 
 
where NiY  and NY  denote respectively the net-output of sector i and aggregate 
net-output. “Net-output” means here gross-output minus real value of 
intermediates inputs; thus, net-output is equal to “real-value added”. Hence, NiY  
is given by the following relation: 
 
(15c) HzYpYp iii
N
ii −=  
 
where H is the aggregate value of all intermediates which have been produced 
(see later equation (18) as well). We use “net output”, since in reality GDP does 
not include intermediates production in order to avoid “double counting of 
intermediates production”. (See, e.g., Landefeld et al. (2008) on intermediate 
inputs and GDP.) Furthermore, the relationship between gross-output and net-
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output in our model can be seen in equation (A.25) from APPENDIX A and 
equations (16).) 
Overall, our GDP-deflator (equation (15b)) is simply a weighted-average of 
prices, where we used net-outputs as weights. If we divide our aggregate net-
output (expressed in manufacturing terms) by this deflator we have a GDP-
measure which is similar to the one which is used in reality. However, all the 
issues regarding the choice of the numéraire are irrelevant when looking at 
shares or ratios (since the changes in the numéraire of the numerator offset the 
changes in the (same) numéraire of the denominator). For example, the capital-
to-output ratio ( NYK / ) is the same irrespective of the numéraire. (See also Ngai 
and Pissarides (2007), p.435 and Ngai and Pissarides (2004), p.21.) 
 
2.4 Aggregates and sectors  
We define aggregate (gross-)output (Y ), aggregate net-output ( NY ), real GDP 
(GDP ), aggregate consumption expenditures (E) and aggregate value of 
intermediate inputs ( H ) as follows: 
 
(16a) ∑
=
≡
n
i
iiYpY
1
 
(16b) HYYN −≡  
(16c) 
p
YGDP N≡  
(17) ∑
=
≡
n
i
iiCpE
1
 
(18) ∑
=
≡
n
i
iihpH
1
 
 
Throughout the paper we use aggregate net-output instead of aggregate (gross-
)output (Y), since in general GDP does not include intermediates. (In our model 
Y is equal to the sum of investment, consumption and intermediates-value (H); 
see equation (A.25) in APPENDIX A.) 
The aggregate input-shares of the junior-sector ),,( JJJ zkl and the aggregate input-
shares of the senior-sector ),,( SSS zkl  are given by: 
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The aggregate consumption expenditures on junior-goods ( JE ) and senior-goods 
)( SE  are given by: 
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SE  could also be interpreted as the budget devoted to the old. Throughout the 
paper we assume that the aggregate budget is distributed across the old and the 
young according to the representative household utility function (social welfare 
function). That is, budgets are such to maximize social welfare.  
 
3. Model equilibrium 
3.1 Optimality conditions 
The model, as specified in the previous section, can be solved by maximizing life-
time utility (equations (1)-(6)) subject to equations (7)-(15a), e.g. by using a 
Hamiltonian function. The intra- and intertemporal optimality conditions are 
(where we assume that there is free mobility of factors across sectors): 
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where mm Cuu ∂∂≡ /(.) . For a proof that these conditions are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an optimum, see Stijepic (2011). 
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By using equations (1)-(20) these optimality conditions (equations (21)-(23)) can 
be transformed into the following equations (sections 3.2 and 3.3) describing the 
aggregate and sectoral behaviour of the economy (for a proof of these equations 
see APPENDIX A): 
 
3.2 Aggregates 
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⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
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⎤
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⎡
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Definition 1: NYandPDGYEK ˆˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  stand for NYandGDPYEK   ,,,  expressed in 
“labour-efficiency-units, i.e. 
cLG
YY
−
≡
1
1
ˆ , 
cLG
KK
−
≡
1
1
ˆ , 
cLG
EE
−
≡
1
1
ˆ , 
cLG
GDPPDG
−
≡
1
1
ˆ  and 
c
N
N
LG
YY
−
≡
1
1
ˆ . 
 
Note that this definition of variables in efficiency units makes our discussion 
about the equilibrium growth path easier later. 
 
Proposition 1: Sp  stands for the price of senior goods. Sp  is given by: 
[ ] )(
1
)(1
)()(
1
ˆ
αμγχεα
α
χεμγγ
αμγχεαανχβμαγχ
ε
αμαναχ
λεγμ
γ
ν
β
χ
α −+−+−
−+−−
= ⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡ ∏
S
S
S
i
B
AKp
m
n
i
iS  
Proof: Remember that senior goods are produced by the same production 
functions; hence each senior good has the same price, Sp . The rest of the proof is 
given in APPENDIX A. Q.E.D. 
 
We can see that (beside of the GDP-measure) the optimum aggregate structure of 
this economy is quite similar to the optimum structure of the standard Ramsey-
model (or sometimes also named “Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model”).7 For a given 
mλ , equations (24)-(26b) determine the equilibrium savings rate of the model 
(optimal intertemporal allocation of factors), like in the normal Ramsey-model. 
(In fact, for mλ = 1 equations (24)-(26b) are the same as the corresponding 
equations of the standard Ramsey-model). Equation (26c) determines mλ  as 
function of cross-sectors demand patterns (see also later equations (30) and (31)). 
mλ  can be regarded as a productivity indicator of aggregate production: it 
captures the changes in aggregate productivity which are caused by factor-
reallocation across technologically distinct sectors (junior and senior sector), 
since mλ  depends only on the allocation of labour across the junior and senior 
                                                 
7 For discussion of the standard Ramsey-model, see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
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sectors: ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += SJm ll βχ
ανλ .8 Furthermore, equation (26c) determines the mλ  
which is consistent with the efficient (intratemporal) allocation of factors across 
sectors, since equation (26c) can be derived from equations (14) and (21) (among 
others); see as well the derivations in APPENDIX A. (Equations (14) state that all 
factors must be used in production, i.e. no factors are wasted; equation (26c) 
requires that marginal rates of technical substitution are equal across sectors, i.e. 
factors are efficiently allocated across sectors.)  
 
3.3 Sectors 
(28) 
)(
)()(
ανχβ
λαχβνβαδε −
−+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +++= mJJJ Y
KK
Y
H
Y
El
&
 
(29) α
χ
ανχβ
λαχβνβαε
)(
)()(
−
−+−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += mSSS Y
H
Y
El  
(30) 
N
LEEJ =  
(31) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=
N
LEES 1  
(32a) 
m
m
i
i
l
k
l
k
χβ
αν=   for  nmi ,...1+=  
(32b) i
m
m
i ll
kk =   for  mi ,...1=  
(33a) 
m
m
i
i
l
z
l
z
χγ
αμ=   for  nmi ,...1+=  
(33b) i
m
m
i ll
z
z =    for  mi ,...1=  
 
where ∑
=
≡
m
i
iJ
1
εε . 
For a proof of these equations see APPENDIX B. 
We can see that ageing (i.e. changes in L/N) induces demand shifts between the 
junior- and the senior-sector (equations (30) and (31)). These demand shifts lead 
                                                 
8 This equation can be derived by using equation (A.23) from APPENDIX A and equations (14) 
and (19). 
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to changes in factor allocation between these two sectors (here shown by changes 
in employment shares; see equations (28) and (29)). Further factor-reallocation 
between the senior- and the junior-sector is caused by changes in aggregate 
capital demand (since only the junior-sector produces capital) and by changes in 
aggregate intermediates demand. 
 
Proposition 2: Capital intensity in the senior sector (
Ll
Kk
S
S ) is lower in 
comparison to capital-intensity in the junior sector (
Ll
Kk
J
J ), provided that 
χβαν <  ( )χγαμ < . Intermediate-intensity in the senior sector (
Ll
Zz
S
S ) is lower 
in comparison to intermediate-intensity in the junior sector (
Ll
Zz
J
J ), provided that 
χβαν <  ( )χγαμ < . 
Proof: Since capital intensity in a subsector i is given by i
Ll
Kk
i
i ∀, , and 
intermediates intensity in a subsector i is given by i
Ll
Zz
i
i ∀, , equations (19), (32) 
and (33) imply this proposition. Q.E.D. 
 
4. Effects of ageing 
To study the effects of ageing we compare the economy without ageing (L/N = 
constant) to the economy with ageing (L/N  decreases), ceteris paribus. In all the 
following argumentation, ageing (i.e. a change in L/N or a change in 
N
LN − ) 
means that Ng  changes and not Lg . That is, we assume that L is independent of 
ageing (i.e. it grows at constant rate Lg  irrespective of whether ageing takes place 
or not). In this way we can clearly distinguish between growth-effects of ageing 
via factor-reallocation, which are in the focus of our paper, and growth effects of 
changes in labour supply (i.e. changes in the growth rate of L). The latter are well 
known from standard (one-sector) models. 
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(Working)Definition 2: Ageing stands for an increase in N/L, where Lg  is 
constant.  
 
In the next section (4.1) we discuss the equilibrium without ageing. In section 4.2, 
we analyze the effects of ageing in a simpler version of our model, where only 
cross-sector-differences in TFP-growth are allowed for. In section 4.3 the effects 
of ageing are analyzed in the general version of the model, where it is allowed for 
cross-sector differences in input-elasticities as well. 
 
4.1 Partially Balanced Growth Path (PBGP) without ageing 
In this subsection we assume that there is no ageing, i.e. L/N = constant.  
 
Definition 3: A “partially balanced growth path” (“PBGP”) is an equilibrium 
growth path where NYYEK ˆ ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  and mλ  are constant. 
 
The name “partially balanced growth path” reflects the fact that along the PBGP 
some variables ( NYEKY  and ,, ) behave as if they were on a balanced growth 
path (steady state), while the other variables (e.g. GDP) do not behave in this 
manner, i.e. they grow at non-constant rates, as we will see soon. (This concept is 
similar to the concept of “aggregate balanced growth”, which is used by Ngai and 
Pissarides (2007).)  
 
Lemma 1: There exists a unique PBGP of the dynamic equation system (24)-(26), 
provided that L/N is constant.  
Proof: It can be seen at first sight that equations (24)-(26) imply that there is an 
equilibrium growth path where NYYEK ˆ ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  and mλ  are constant, provided that 
L/N is constant. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 2: Along the PBGP, the growth rate of the variables NYEKY  and ,,  is 
given by 
(34) .
)1(
)1(* constgggg L
SS
BSAS =++−
+−= χγεαμε
γεμε  
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(where L/N is constant). 
Proof: This lemma is implied by Definitions 1 and 3. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 3: Along the PBGP, factors are not shifted between the senior- and the 
junior-sector, i.e. Jl  and Sl  are constant, (where L/N is constant). 
Proof:  This lemma is implied by equations (28)-(31), by Definitions 1 and 3 and 
by Lemma 2. Q.E.D. 
 
Definition 4: An asterisk (*) denotes the PBGP-value of the corresponding 
variable.  
 
Now, we derive the PBGP-values of variables as functions of exogenous 
parameters: 
 
Lemma 4: Along the PBGP, the variables PDGYYEK N ˆ,ˆ ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  and mλ  are given 
by the following functions of exogenous model parameters (where L/N is 
constant) 
(35a) *1
1
*ˆ
m
csK λ−=  
(35b) *1
1
1*ˆ
m
cc
c
ssE λρα −− +=  
(35c) ανχβ
λαχββα
−
−+−= −
*
1* )()(ˆ mc
c vsY  
(35d) )(ˆ *1* mc
c
N sY βλα += −  
(35e) 
s
N
LN
N
LN
S
S
m
β
ρανχβεμαχγα
ανχβεμβνγβ
β
αλ −−+−+
−−−−+
=
)()(
)()(
*  
(35f) 
1
***2*1* )1()1()1()(ˆ
−
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−
−−−++= Smmmc
c
psPDG ανχβ
μαβλβλαβλα  
where  
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(35g) 
[ ] )(
1
)(1
)()(
1
1
1
*
αμγχεα
α
χεμγγ
αμγχεαανχβμαγχ
ε
αμαναχ
εγμ
γ
ν
β
χ
α −+−+−
−+−
−
−
= ⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∏
S
S
S
i
B
Asp c
n
i
iS  
(35h) 
c
g
g
s
G
L −+++
≡
1
ρδ
β . 
Proof: To determine the PBGP-values of NYYEK ˆ ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  and mλ  we have to set 
0ˆ =K&  and 0ˆ =E&  (because of Definition 3). Then equations (24)-(27) imply 
Lemma 4. Remember that in this section L/N is constant. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 5: The young-to-old ratio (
N
L ) has an impact on the PBGP-levels of 
aggregate variables ***** ˆ,ˆ ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ PDGYYEK N  and 
*
mλ  (where L/N is constant). 
Proof: This lemma is implied by equations (35). Q.E.D.. 
 
Lemma 6: *ˆPDG  does not grow at constant rate along the PBGP (even when N/L 
is constant).  
Proof: This lemma is implied by (35f). Note that equation (35g) implies that *Sp  
is not constant along the PBGP. Q.E.D.  
 
Lemma 6 shows a quite convenient feature of our model: we can study the rich 
dynamics of the GDP (where the reallocation-effects of ageing cause unbalanced-
growth of GDP) while the other variables are on a (partially) balanced growth 
path (partial steady state). This fact makes it possible to analyze the impacts of 
ageing without simulations. 
 
Lemma 7a: A saddle-path, along which the economy converges to the PBGP, 
exists in the neighbourhood of the PBGP of the dynamic equation system (24)-
(26). 
Lemma 7b: If intermediates are omitted (i.e. if 0== μγ ), the PBGP of the 
dynamic equation system (24)-(26) is locally stable. 
Proof: see APPENDIX C. 
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Corollary 1: Even if the initial capital level is not given by equation (35a), the 
economy which is described by the aggregate equation system (24)-(26) 
converges to the PBGP, provided that L/N is constant. 
Proof: This corollary follows from Lemmas 1, 4 and 7. Q.E.D. 
 
4.2 Ageing and cross-sector differences in TFP-growth 
In this subsection we provide a simpler version of our model, which is helpful to 
understand the general mechanism which leads to the reallocation effects of 
ageing. We assume now that input-elasticities are equal across sectors, i.e. 
νβχα == ,  and, thus, μγ = . Furthermore, we assume that ageing takes place.  
 
Lemma 8: If νβχα == ,  and, thus, μγ = , equations (24)-(35) become:  
(24)’ K
c
g
gEKK GL
c ˆ)
1
(ˆˆ)(ˆ −++−−+= δβα
&  
(25)’ 
c
ggK
E
E G
L
c
−−−−−=
−
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
1 ρδβ
&
 
(26a)’ cKY ˆˆ =  
(26b)’ )(ˆˆ βα += cN KY  
(26c)’ 1=mλ  
(26d)’ YYYH N ˆˆˆˆ γ=−=  
(27)’ 
1
1)(ˆˆ
−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++=
B
BAlKPDG S
c βα  
(28)’ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +++=
Y
KK
Y
H
N
L
Y
El JJ
δε &  
(29)' ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= SS Y
H
N
L
Y
El ε1  
(34)' LBSAS g
gg
g ++−= α
γεγε )1(*  
(35a)’  csK −= 1
1
*ˆ  
(35b)’ cc
c
ssE −− += 1
1
1*ˆ ρα  
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(35c)’ c
c
sY −= 1*ˆ  
(35d)' )(ˆ 1* βα += −c
c
N sY  
(35f)' 
1
1* 1)(1)(ˆ
−
−
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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c
N
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B
BAsPDG γεραβα  
where 10 <+=< βα
βc ,   βα
βα
ε
ε
βα εγ +
−−
=
+
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡≡ ∏
1
1
1 n
i
i
i
S
A
BAG . 
Proof: The proof is quite straight-forward. Therefore, we omit it here. Note that 
following steps are necessary to obtain equation (27)’: By inserting equation 
(26c) into equation (27) the following equation can be obtained:  
 
[ ] 12 )1)(1(
/1
)/ˆ/(ˆ/)()(ˆˆ
−
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−+−
−−−++= S
SS
c
mS
mm
c
m
c pKENLNKPDG μαχγεμε
λγεβλαβλαλ
 
This term can be reformulated by using the other equations to obtain 
[ ][ ] 1)/1(ˆ/ˆ/)(1)(ˆˆ −−−+−+= BAYENLNKPDG Sc γεβα . Then, by using 
equations (26d)’ and (29)’, equation (27)’ can be derived. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 9: If input-elasticities are equal across sectors, there exists a unique 
PBGP, irrespective of whether ageing takes place or not, and irrespective of the 
rate of ageing. 
Proof: Lemma 8 implies that equations (24)’-(26)’ apply here. The proof of 
Lemma 9 can be seen directly from equations (24)’-(26c)’, which are nearly the 
same as in the standard one-sector Ramsey model. Since equations (24)’-(26)’ 
are not dependent on L/N, the existence of the PBGP is not affected by changes in 
L/N. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 10: If input-elasticities are equal across sectors, the growth rate of the 
variables NYEKY  and ,,,  is given by equation (34)’ along the PBGP. 
Proof: This lemma is implied by Lemma 8 and Definitions 1 and 3. Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 11: If input elasticities are equal across sectors, the PBGP is globally 
saddle-path stable, irrespective of whether ageing takes place or not. 
Proof: Lemma 8 implies that equations (24)’-(26)’ apply. Equations (24)’ and 
(25)’ are the same as in the standard Ramsey-model regarding all relevant 
features. Therefore, the aggregate system of our model behaves like the standard 
Ramsey-model, i.e. it is globally saddle-path stable. (See also Ngai and Pissarides 
(2007) on the stability of such frameworks.). Since equations (24)’-(26)’ are 
independent of L/N, ageing has no impact on the stability of the PBGP. Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 2: When input-elasticities are equal across sectors, ageing is irrelevant 
regarding the development of the variables NYandEKY   ,,,  in our model: Neither 
the PBGP-growth rate *g  nor the PBGP-levels **** ˆ andˆ,ˆ,ˆ NYYEK  are affected 
by (the level or the growth rate of) L/N. A change in L/N does not induce a 
deviation from the (initial) PBGP with respect to NYandEKY   ,,, . 
Proof: This corollary is implied by Lemmas 8-10 and equations (35). Q.E.D. 
 
Now we take a look at the disaggregated variables of the economy. 
 
Theorem 1: If input-elasticities are equal across sectors, ageing shifts demand 
from the junior-sectors to the senior-sectors along the PBGP. That is, decreases 
in L/N lead to decreases in EEJ /  and increases in EES / .  
Proof: This theorem is implied by equations (30) and (31). Remember that, as 
argued in section 2, the choice of the numéraire is irrelevant when looking at 
shares or ratios. Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 2: If input-elasticities are equal across sectors, ageing reallocates 
factors from the junior-sectors to the senior-sectors along the PBGP; i.e. 
decreases in L/N lead to decreases in Jl  and increases in Sl . 
Proof: This theorem is implied by Lemma 8 and equations (28)’ and (29)’. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Theorem 3: If input elasticities are equal across sectors, ageing reduces the 
growth rate of GDP along the PBGP, provided that the TFP-growth rate (and the 
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TFP-level) is lower in the senior sector in comparison to the junior sector. That 
is, a decreasing L/N causes a reduction of the GDP-growth rate, provided that 
A>B and BA gg > . 
Proof: This theorem is implied by Lemma 8 and equation (35f)’. Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary 3: If input-elasticities are equal across sectors, ageing shifts demand 
from the junior-sectors to the senior-sector. These demand shift cause factor 
reallocation from the junior-sector to the senior-sector. This reallocation process 
reduces the growth rate of GDP provided that the senior-sector has a relatively 
low TFP(growth-rate) in comparison to the senior sector. 
Proof: This corollary is implied by Theorems 1-3. Q.E.D. 
 
Hence, whether ageing increases or decreases the GDP-growth-rate depends only 
on the TFP-relation between the junior and senior sectors. The factors which 
determine the strength of the ageing-impact are analyzed in the next section. 
 
As argued in section 2, the choice of the numéraire is irrelevant when looking at 
shares or ratios. Hence, we can analyze the senior-goods-consumption-to-output 
ratio ( NS YE / ) without worrying about numéraire choice. The share of senior-
budget in aggregate output ( NS YE / ) increases at the same rate as the old-to-
young ratio (see equation (31) and remember that along the PBGP E and NY  grow 
at the same rate).  
All the results from this section are valid for the case that the budget devoted to 
seniors (e.g. old age pensions) develops according to the social welfare function 
(representative household utility function). If however political issues led to a 
reduction of old age pensions, the ageing-impacts would be weaker. We will 
discuss this case later. 
 
4.3 Ageing and cross-sector differences in input-
elasticities 
Now let us assume that input-elasticities differ across sectors, i.e. νβχα ≠≠ ,  
and μγ ≠ . (The TFP-growth rates differ across sectors as well.) Furthermore, in 
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this paper we analyze only the case where the capital intensity in the senior sector 
is lower in comparison to the junior sector (i.e. χβαν < ), since this case is in 
general assumed in the literature (see also Proposition 2). We assume that initially 
the economy is in the equilibrium described in section 4.1 with L/N = constant. In 
sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 we analyze what happens if there is a one time decrease 
in L/N (according to Definition 2). (After this decrease L/N is constant again.) In 
section 4.3.3 we generalize our results to the case where L/N increases 
consecutively. Furthermore, in section 4.3.1 we analyze the effects of ageing on 
net-output and on the pension-to-output ratio and we derive the impact channels, 
whereas in section 4.3.2 we look at the differences in this analysis when our 
GDP-measure is taken into account. 
 
4.3.1 Productivity effect: Impacts and channels 
In this subsection the term “aggregates” refers only to EYY N ,,  and K  but not to 
GDP. 
 
Lemma 12: A one time decrease in L/N leads to a change of the PBGP. That is, 
the economy leaves the old PBGP and there is a transition period where the 
economy converges to the new PBGP. The growth rate of aggregates ( *g ) is the 
same along the old and the new PBGP.  
Proof: Remember that we assume here again that the input-elasticities differ 
across sectors; hence equations (24)-(35) apply here. Equations (35) imply that 
there must be a transition period, since the old and the new PBGP require 
different equilibrium capital levels; i.e. *K  depends on L/N. (That is, the capital 
level which exists when the decrease in L/N occurs is not the same as the capital 
level which brings the economy directly on the new PBGP; we know from the 
discussion of the standard one-sector Ramsey-model that this induces a transition 
period, where the economy is converging to the new PBGP.) Furthermore, 
Lemma 7 and Corollary 1 imply that the economy will converge to the new PBGP 
(provided that the decrease in L/N is not too strong). Equation (34) implies that 
the growth rate of aggregates ( *g ) is the same along the old and the new PBGP, 
since *g  does not depend on L/N. Q.E.D. 
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Lemma 13: A one-time decrease in L/N reduces the growth rate of aggregates 
during the transition period between the old and the new PBGP. That is, the 
growth-rate of aggregates ( NYandEK   ,, ) during the transition period is lower in 
comparison to the growth rate of aggregates along the (old and new) PBGP ( *g ). 
Proof: To prove this lemma we need the following derivatives of equations (35). 
(Note that our key results would not change, if we calculated here elasticities 
instead of derivatives.) 
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From these equations we can see that a one-time decrease in L/N leads to a 
decrease in *mλ . The decrease in *mλ  leads to a decrease in *** ˆ and ,ˆ,ˆ NYEK .9 
Hence, the values of *** ˆ and ,ˆ,ˆ NYEK  along the new PBGP are lower in 
comparison to those of the old PBGP. Therefore, we can conclude that 
*** ˆ and ,ˆ,ˆ NYEK  decrease during the transition period. Hence, the growth rate of 
aggregates ( NYEK  and , ) during the transition period is lower than 
*g . 
(Remember that Definitions 1 and 3 and Lemma 2 imply the following: if 
*** ˆ and ˆ,ˆ NYEK  are constant, aggregates ( NYEK  and , ) grow at the constant rate 
                                                 
9 Note that the effects of ageing on aggregate gross-output Y may be positive or negative 
depending on the sign of the term αχ − . This reflects the fact that depending on the input-
elasticities ageing can lead to an increase in intermediates production that is stronger than the 
decrease in net-output and vice versa. 
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*g ; hence, if *** ˆ and ˆ,ˆ NYEK  decrease, the growth rate of NYEK  and ,  is lower 
than *g . Note that this argumentation works, since “efficiency units” are the same 
along the old and the new PBGP: We express the variables in efficiency units (see 
Definition 1) as follows: e.g. 
cLG
YY
−
≡
1
1
ˆ ; since cLG −1
1
 does not change due to 
ageing, efficiency units are the same along the old and the new PBGP.) Q.E.D. 
 
We will discuss the intuition behind this lemma soon; at first we postulate two 
lemmas, which are helpful to understand Lemma 13. 
 
Lemma 14: A one-time decrease in L/N shifts demand from the junior-sector to 
the senior-sector. That is, along the new PBGP 
E
ES  is higher (
E
EJ  is lower) in 
comparison to the 
E
ES (
E
EJ ) of the old PBGP. 
Proof: This lemma is implied by equations (30) and (31). Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 15: A one-time decrease in L/N leads to factor reallocation from the 
junior-sector to the senior-sector. That is, along the new PBGP Sl  is higher in 
comparison to the Sl  of the old PBGP. 
Proof: By using equation (A.23) from APPENDIX A, it can be shown that the 
employment share along the PBGP is given by ανχβ
χβλ −−= )1(
**
mSl . Since 
equation (36e) implies that 0
1
*
<
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂
N
L
mλ , a decrease in L/N leads to a decrease in 
*
mλ . Therefore, *Sl  increases due to a decrease in L/N. (Remember that we 
assume that 0>−ανχβ .) Q.E.D. 
 
Now, we discuss the intuition behind Lemma 13: We know that output is 
produced by using labour and capital. Ageing shifts demand (and, thus, 
production factors) towards senior-sectors (as implied by Lemmas 14 and 15). 
The key feature of the senior-sectors is that capital is less productivity-enhancing 
 28
in comparison to the (junior-sectors). This is reflected by the fact that optimal 
capital intensity in the senior-sector is lower in comparison to the junior-sector 
(see Proposition 2). Hence, the ageing-induced (one-time) demand-shift implies 
that aggregate capital becomes less productive when looking at the economy-
wide-averages. Therefore, at the aggregate level a one-time decrease in L/N acts 
similarly like a negative productivity-shock (a decrease in the productivity of 
capital).10 This leads to the negative impacts on aggregate net-output-growth, 
aggregate capital-growth and aggregate consumption-expenditures-growth (and of 
course, the savings rate decreases, since savings which are invested in capital 
become less rentable, i.e. the opportunity costs of consumption decrease). This 
adjustment-process occurs during the transition period. Since a one-time 
productivity-level-shock has no impacts on productivity-growth rates, the 
economy converges to a growth path (PBGP) where the growth rate is the same as 
before. (Remember that steady state growth rates are determined only by 
productivity-growth and not by productivity-levels within the standard (one-
sector) Ramsey-model; in this respect our aggregate model is the same as the 
standard Ramsey model.) 
A further interesting question is about the effects of ageing on the senior-budget-
to-the-net-output-ratio ( NS YE / ). Equations (31), (35b) and (35d) imply the 
following derivative (consider also equation (36e)): 
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Hence, we can see that ageing increases the senior-budget-to-output-ratio. The 
first term on the right-hand-side of equation (37) may be regarded as the direct 
effect of ageing (i.e. an increase in the old-to-young ratio, increases the share of 
the seniors in the overall consumption-to-output-share).11 The second term may 
be regarded as an indirect effect: the increase in the old-to-young ratio leads to an 
                                                 
10 This fact is reflected by the ageing-induced decrease in *mλ , which is implied by equation (36e); 
as discussed in section three *mλ  can be interpreted as a productivity indicator, which reflects the 
aggregate impacts of cross-sector factor-reallocation. 
11 since **** /*/)(/ NNS YENLNYE −= . 
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increase in the overall consumption-to-output-share12 (i.e. as noted above the 
savings-rate decreases due to lower productivity level). 
 
We can see from equations (36) and (37) that a rich “portfolio” of parameters 
determines the strength of the impact of ageing. (Note that this portfolio would 
not change, if we calculated elasticities instead of derivatives in equations (36) 
and (37).) These parameters are:  
a) technology parameters: input-elasticities of sectoral production functions 
(including labour, capital and intermediates elasticities), TFP-growth-rates (via 
Gg ) and the depreciation rate 
b) time preference rate 
c) old-to-young ratio and the growth rate of labour. 
The reason for the fact that so many parameters determine the impact of ageing is 
the following: The demand-shift across technologically distinct sectors makes it 
necessary to change the (average) aggregate structure of the economy, especially 
the ratios between aggregate capital, labour and aggregate intermediates. The 
sectoral technology parameters (especially the input-elasticities) determine how 
strong this change has to be. Furthermore, since changes in capital in general 
require an adjustment of the savings rate (
*
*
ˆ
ˆ
1
Y
E− ), all the variables which 
determine the savings rate come into account, especially the parameters captured 
by the auxiliary variable s; see equations (35), e.g. the time-preference rate. The 
portfolio of parameters which determine the savings rate includes all those 
parameters which are already known to determine the savings-rate of the standard 
Ramsey-model (see the auxiliary variable “s”). However, our model provides a 
sector foundation of those parameters: especially, Gg  and c are assumed to be 
exogenous in the standard Ramsey-model, while in our model these two variables 
are functions of sectoral parameters. 
 
                                                 
12 since ( ) ( ) 01)(/)(/)(
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4.3.2 Additional impacts on GDP: The price-effect 
Remember that we have shown in the previous section that a one-time increase in 
L/N leads to a transition from the old PBGP to a new PBGP. Due to this fact, the 
effect of ageing on real GDP-growth can be divided into transitional effects and 
PBGP-effects. Transitional effects have an impact on the real GDP-growth-rate 
during the transition between two PBGPs, while PBGP-effects of ageing have an 
impact on the growth rate along the new (PBGP). In fact we have shown that the 
effects from the previous section are transitional. In this section we will introduce 
a new effect which affects real GDP-growth (but not the growth rate of other 
aggregate variables). We name this effect price effect, and we show that this 
effect is not only transitional. 
 
4.3.2.1 Transitional effects of ageing on GDP 
To show these facts we have to calculate the derivative of equation (35f): 
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and where *Sp  is given by equation (35g). 
(For an explicit proof see APPENDIX D.) A “(+)” (a “(-)”) above a term denotes 
that this term is positive (negative).  
 
Theorem 4: A one-time decrease in L/N has a negative impact on the growth rate 
of GDP during the transition between the old and the new PBGP, provided that 
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senior goods are “more expensive” in comparison to junior-goods; i.e. provided 
that 1* >Sp , where *Sp  is given by equation (35g). 
Proof: This theorem is implied by equation (38). If 1* >Sp , an increase in the 
old-to-young-ratio has a negative impact on the *ˆPDG -level (and hence a 
negative impact on the GDP-growth-rate during the transition period; see also the 
argumentation in the proof of Lemma 13). Note that *Sp  is always positive and 
determined by exogenous parameters. Furthermore, note that the relative price of 
senior goods is given by *Sp  (see proposition 1) and the price of junior goods is 
given by 1. The latter comes from the fact that sector m is numéraire (see 
equation (15a)) and belongs to the junior-sector and all junior sub-sectors have 
identical production functions (see also equations (A.5) and (A.6) in APPENDIX 
A). Q.E.D. 
 
If 1* <Sp , the effect of an increase in the old-to-young ratio may be positive or 
negative, depending on the parameter constellation, where the effect can be 
positive provided that *Sp  is relatively small (i.e. relatively close to zero). To 
isolate the set of parameter-values which ensures that the GDP-effect of ageing is 
positive when *Sp  is relatively close to zero, we have to calculate the limit-value 
of the term within the squared brackets of equation (38), i.e. 
(39) 
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where ανχβ
χβλ −−= )1(
**
mSl . 
If (39) is negative, equation (38) implies that for small values of *Sp  the effect of 
ageing is positive regarding GDP-growth. Equation (39) implies that, e.g., αβ <  
is a stronger than necessary condition for this. (Remember that we assume that 
χβαν < .)  
 32
Now, the question is what parameter constellations ensure that *Sp  is relatively 
small.  
 
Lemma 16: In the limit 1* >Sp  ( )1* <Sp , provided that the growth rate of 
labour-augmenting technological progress in the junior-sector is higher (lower) 
in comparison to the growth rate of labour-augmenting technological progress in 
the senior-sector, i.e. provided that BA gg χα
11 >  ( BA gg χα
11 < ). 
Proof: We know from equation (35g) that the actual level of *Sp  is determined 
by a time-variant term )/( αχ BA  and by a constant term 
( ανχβ
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i
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). αχ BA /  approaches infinity (zero), 
provided that BA gg χα
11 >  ( BA gg χα
11 < ). Thus, in the limit *Sp  approaches 
infinity (zero) as well, i.e. *Sp  becomes larger (smaller) than 1. Q.E.D. 
 
Hence, depending on the parameter setting, several cases can exist: (1) *Sp  can 
be relatively close to zero in the beginning, but approach to infinity with time; (2) 
*Sp  can be relatively close to zero in the beginning and approach to zero with 
time; (3) *Sp  can be relatively large in the beginning but approach to zero with 
time; (4) *Sp  can be relatively large in the beginning and approach to infinity 
with time.  
These cases and the discussion above (about equations (35g) and (38)) imply that 
ageing may have positive and negative impacts on GDP-growth (during the 
transition period) depending on the exact constellation of parameters from 
equations (35g) and (38). Moreover, the effect of ageing may change with time 
(in cases (1) and (3)), i.e. in the beginning the effect on GDP-growth may be 
positive (negative) but later negative (positive). 
Nevertheless, in the limit only the term αχ BA /  (together with equation (38)) 
determines whether a future increase in the old-to-young ratio leads to an increase 
or to a decrease in GDP(-growth). Hence, from the today’s point of view the 
growth rate of this term (namely BA gg αχ − ) is deciding for the question about 
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the (distant) future impacts of ageing: If 0>− BA gg αχ  (or: BA gg χα
11 > ) we 
know that *Sp  approaches infinity. Hence, we know that sooner or later ageing 
will have negative (transitional) effects on GDP-growth. Otherwise, if 
0<− BA gg αχ  (or: BA gg χα
11 < ) we know that sooner or later ageing could 
have positive (transitional) effects on GDP-growth. This seems to be a quite 
convenient rule of thumb. Especially, since in this way the effects of ageing are 
related to two quite comprehensible and estimable parameters: in fact, our 
production functions imply that Agα
1  and Bgχ
1  are the growth rates or labour-
augmenting technological progress in the senior sector and junior sector 
respectively. Nevertheless, this is only a rule of thumb, since the other variables 
from equation (35g) may be dominant for a long period of time, if BA gg αχ −  is 
not very large (i.e. if αχ BA /  changes slowly). 
 
Theorem 5: In the limit, a one-time decrease in L/N has a negative impact on the 
growth rate of GDP during the transition between the old and the new PBGP, 
provided that the growth rate of labour-augmenting technological progress in the 
junior-sector is higher in comparison to the growth rate of labour-augmenting 
technological progress in the senior-sector, i.e. provided that BA gg χα
11 > . 
Proof: This theorem is implied by Theorem 4 and Lemma 16. Q.E.D. 
 
To understand why it is important for the GDP-effects of ageing whether *Sp <1 
or >1, we have to remember that we have shown in the proof of Theorem 4 that 
*
Sp  is the price of senior-sector-goods and that the price of junior-sector-goods is 
equal to unity. Hence, *Sp <1 (>1) means that senior-goods are less (more) 
expensive than junior-goods. Furthermore, with respect to GDP-growth ageing 
has two types of effects: 
a) The “productivity effect” has already been discussed in section 4.3.1. We 
stated there that ageing acts like a negative productivity shock, i.e. it leads to a 
decrease in net-output ( NY ), provided that capital intensity in the senior sector 
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is lower in comparison to the junior-sector. This effect affects the GDP 
measure, since 
p
YGDP N≡  (see equation (16c)). 
b) “Price effect”: Remember that we divide our net-output ( NY ) by the price-
index ( )p  to obtain GDP. Hence, the changes in p  have an impact on GDP 
as well. Ageing leads to changes in p , since the ageing-induced demand-shift 
leads to changes in output-shares which have been used to weight the prices 
of the price index (see equation (15b)). Hence, if the price of the senior sector 
is lower (higher) in comparison to the price of the junior-sector, ageing 
induced demand-shifts lead to a decrease (increase) of p  (since the relatively 
inexpensive senior-goods become a stronger weight in p ). The price effect 
increases (decreases) GDP, provided that the senior-sector price ( *Sp ) is 
lower (higher) in comparison to the junior-sector price ( = 1). Note that the 
change in the weights of the price-index has (permanent) growth impacts as 
well, as will be of importance in the next section: since relative prices ( ip ) are 
changing over time, a change in the weighting causes permanent growth 
effects; e.g., if the weight is shifted towards relatively strongly growing 
prices, the price index increases more strongly over time. 
Hence, if *Sp >1, both effects (the productivity effect and the price effect) point to 
the same direction, i.e. GDP-growth decreases. On the other hand, if *Sp <1, the 
productivity effect has a negative impact on GDP-growth, but the price effect 
increases GDP-growth. Hence, it is deciding which of those effects is stronger. 
 
Summary: If model parameters (in equation (35g)) are such that the price of 
senior-sector-goods is relatively low, ageing may have positive transitional 
impacts on GDP. For example, if parameters from equation (35g) are such that 
*
Sp  is close to zero and if αβ < , ageing has a (temporary) positive effect on 
GDP-growth, since in this case the positive price effect is stronger than the 
negative productivity effect. However, whether the transitional effects of a future 
decrease in L/N will be positive depends on the growth rate of αχ BA / , which 
determines the growth rate of the senior-goods-price, and, hence, the price effect. 
On the other hand, if the model parameters are such that the price of the senior 
 35
sector ( *Sp ) is higher than the price of the junior sector ( =1), ageing has a 
negative transitional impact on GDP-growth, since the productivity effect and the 
price effect point to the same direction. Whether future ageing will have negative 
(transitional) effects in this case depends on the development of the term αχ BA /  
(and on the parameters of equation (35g)). Equations (35g) and (38) imply that 
the parameter-portfolio which determines the strength and direction of the ageing-
impact comprises:  
a) sectoral labour-, capital- and intermediates-elasticities of output 
( iεμνχγβα ,,,,,, ) 
b) the parameters which determine the steady-state savings rate in 
neoclassical growth models (e.g. the time-preference rate, depreciation rate) (via 
parameter “s” in equation (35g)) 
c) the relative level and growth rate of labour-augmenting technological 
progress in junior-sector in comparison to the senior sector (via the term αχ BA / ) 
d)  population-parameters (the old-to-young ratio (
N
LN −
) via *Sl  and the 
growth-rate of labour ( Lg ) via parameter “s”). 
 
4.3.2.2 PBGP-effects of ageing 
In this subsection we show that ageing has not only transitional effects on GDP, 
but it affects the growth rate of GDP along the PBGP. That is, we show that the 
GDP-growth rate along the old PBGP is not the same as the GDP-growth rate 
along the new PBGP, where the new PBGP arises due to an increase in the old-to-
young-ratio. This permanent effect is due to the price effect, which has been 
introduced in the previous section (after Theorem 5). Note that in contrast to the 
previous section the price effect in this section is permanent: A change in the 
weighting of prices induces permanent growth-effects, since prices are changing 
over time. Hence, a shift towards senior goods, which’s prices increase more 
strongly than the prices of junior-goods (in the limit), increases the growth rate of 
the price index permanently and, thus, reduces the growth rate of GDP. 
 
Theorem 6: A one-time decrease in L/N reduces (increases) the PBGP-growth 
rate of GDP, provided that the growth rate of labour-augmenting technological 
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progress in the junior-sector is higher (lower) in comparison to the growth rate of 
labour-augmenting technological progress in the senior-sector, i.e. provided that 
BA gg χα
11 >  ( BA gg χα
11 < ). That is, the growth rate of GDP along the new 
PBGP is lower (higher) in comparison to the growth rate of GDP along the old 
PBGP, provided that BA gg χα
11 >  ( BA gg χα
11 < ). 
Proof: PDG ˆ  along the PBGP is given by equation (35f). Along the PBGP all 
terms of equation (35f) are constant beside of *Sp , which is given by equation 
(35g). Therefore, we obtain the following growth-rate: 
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Calculating the derivative of this growth rate implies: 
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Equation (36e) implies that 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛∂
∂
N
L
m
*λ >0. Furthermore, remember that we assume 
0>−ανχβ . 
Equation (35g) implies *Sp& > 0 , if BA gg χα
11 > , and *Sp& < 0, if BA gg χα
11 < . 
Hence, equation (40) is positive (negative), if BA gg χα
11 >  ( BA gg χα
11 < ). That 
is, a decrease in L/N has a negative (positive) impact on the GDP-growth rate 
along the PBGP, provided that BA gg χα
11 >  ( BA gg χα
11 < ). Q.E.D. 
 
4.3.3 Dynamic aspects 
By now, in this section we have analyzed the impacts of a one-time increase in 
the old-to-young ratio. If ageing is not regarded as a one-time increase but as a 
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sequence of (discrete) increases in the old-to-young ratio, our results still remain 
applicable: Since we have shown in Lemma 7 (Corollary 1) that the PBGP is 
saddle-path-stable, the economy will be on the converging path. The qualitative 
results remain the same. The overall magnitude of the change in the macro-
variables (e.g. in GDP) is determined by the sum of the changes in the old-to-
young-ratio (overall-change in the old-to-young ratio). Only the period of change 
(the transition period) is more prolonged, since the overall-change is dispersed 
over a sequence (i.e. the economy cannot reach the “final” PBGP before the 
sequence is finished). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have specified how ageing affects the GDP-growth rate and the 
pension-to-GDP-ratio via factor-allocation-effects. In the following we 
summarize our results, compare them to previous literature, derive simple policy-
rules and predictions, show the caveats and extensions of our model and discuss 
topics for further research. 
 
5.1 The most important impact channels associated with factor-allocation-
effects 
In our model ageing has three effects regarding GDP-growth:  
(1) Direct productivity effect (structural change): The ageing-induced demand-
shift alters the factor allocation across technologically distinct sectors, which 
yields a direct productivity effect (average factor-productivities change). 
(2) Indirect productivity effect (capital accumulation): The “direct productivity 
effect” has also an impact on GDP-growth via capital accumulation (change in the 
savings rate). This effect is similar to the effect of a productivity(growth)-increase 
in the standard one-sector Ramsey-model: a change in productivity leads to a 
change in the opportunity costs of consumption, since return on savings depends 
on productivity of capital (remember that savings are invested in capital). Note 
that the change in the savings rate in our model is not the same as the ageing-
induced “savings-effect” in other ageing-models (e.g. in the models by Groezen et 
al. (2005) and Rausch (2006)). In the latter models the effect of ageing on the 
 38
savings rate is modeled as a direct effect (“more saving for retirement, since we 
live longer”). 
(3) Price effect: Since the ageing-induced demand-shift leads to changes of 
sectoral output-shares, the average price-index, which is the weighted average of 
sector prices, changes as well. Hence, ageing leads to changes in GDP-deflator 
(average price index), which has an impact on (real-)GDP as well. 
 
5.2 Parameters which determine the strength and direction of the effects 
We show that the strength and the direction of the factor-allocation-effects of 
ageing depend on the combination of several parameters, including (see also the 
Summary in section 4.3.2.1): 
• technology parameters, e.g. sectoral TFP-growth-rates and (initial) TFP-levels 
as well as input-elasticities of sectoral production functions (including 
intermediates-elasticities, which supports Fougère et al. (2007) and Kuhn 
(2004)), 
• parameters determining the savings rate (due to effect (2)), e.g. the time-
preference rate, and 
• population parameters (the old-to-young-ratio and the growth rate of working-
population). 
 
5.3 Three simple implications for policy making and trend prediction 
As shown in section 4.3.2, despite of its “complexity” our model provides quite 
easily interpretable results, which can be used in empirical research and policy 
making: 
(1) The present and past effects of ageing via structural change can be assessed 
by analyzing the (market) prices of senior-goods and junior-goods. In fact, our 
model implies that ageing has a negative impact on real GDP-growth via 
structural change, if senior goods are “more expensive” than junior goods. 
Otherwise, if senior goods are cheaper, the effects of ageing can be positive or 
negative, depending on the exact constellation of model parameters which are 
summarized in section 5.2. 
(2) For discussion of future effects of ageing analysis of parameters which 
determine the development of relative prices of senior and junior sector is 
necessary. Only in this way we can asses whether it makes sense to assume that 
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senior-goods will be more expensive than junior goods (see point (1)) in future. 
Our results imply that in the limit (or: in the very long run) ageing has negative 
impacts on real GDP-growth, provided that the growth rate of labour-augmenting 
technological progress in the senior sector is lower in comparison to the growth 
rate of labour-augmenting technological progress in the junior-sector. (In this case 
sooner or later senior goods become more expensive in comparison to junior 
goods.) Hence, when discussing the future effects of ageing it is important to 
know about the development of labour-augmenting technological progress in the 
senior and junior sector. (Note that labour-augmenting technological progress is a 
function of TFP-growth and output-elasticity of labour, as discussed in section 
4.3.2.1.) However, as mentioned in section 4.3.2, this is only a rule of thumb, 
since “sooner or later” is a quite vague concept. That is, the exact parameter 
restrictions, which were derived in section 4.3.2, may be the key determinant of 
ageing-impact for a very long period of time; thus, the portfolio of parameters 
which has been summarized in section 5.2 may be an important determinant of 
ageing effects in reality. 
(3) The portfolio of parameters which determine the effects of ageing via 
structural change (see section 5.2) provides a range of policies to counteract the 
negative impacts of ageing on real GDP-growth. Our model can help to isolate 
more or less efficient policies: For example, equation (40) implies that the relative 
price of senior goods can be influenced by policies which have an impact on  
• the savings rate (via “s” in equation (40)),  
• the sectoral output-elasticities of inputs,  
• the growth rate of working population (via “s”) and 
• the sectoral levels and rates of labour-augmenting technological progress. 
For example, policies which influence the savings rate seem to be not effective in 
the very long run, since (as just explained) in the very long run the impacts of 
labour-augmenting technological progress are dominant regarding the 
development of the relative price of senior goods price. On the other hand, e.g., 
policies which increase the birth rate seem to be relatively effective: they do not 
only decrease the old-to-young ratio directly (hence reducing the rate of ageing) 
but also they reduce the relative price of senior goods (via Lg  from “s” in 
equation (40)). 
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5.4 Further results and comparison to previous modelling-literature 
It is unfair to compare our results to the results of previous modelling-literature, 
since we have a different focus of analysis.13 Thus, the following discussion 
should not be understood as critique of the previous literature; in our opinion, the 
assumptions and model-choices which are made in previous literature are optimal 
regarding the goals which are set there. Rather, we aim to emphasize those of our 
results which are “new” in comparison to previous literature. Note that we omit 
here the comparison of technical aspects of modelling and their impacts on the 
results; furthermore, note that the discussion in sections 5.1 to 5.3 may be 
regarded as “novelty” for the most part. 
In contrast to Groezen et al. (2005), our model does not imply that low capital-
intensity in the senior sector is sufficient to constitute negative effects of ageing. 
That is, lower capital-intensity in the senior sector does not necessarily imply that 
senior goods are more expensive in comparison to junior goods. The reason is 
that, in contrast to the model by Groezen et al. (2005), in our model the 
“backward” sector is not completely stagnant, but features TFP-growth. Although 
it is reasonable to assume that senior-goods are and will “always” be relatively 
labour-intensive, it does not make sense to assume that they do not feature any 
TFP-growth.14 Our model implies that such TFP-growth may offset the negative 
impacts of high labour-intensity; thus negative impacts of ageing may not arise in 
this case. Thus, the focus of analysis should be shifted to labour-augmenting 
technological progress, which takes account of both (output-elasticity of capital 
and TFP-growth); see also point (2) in section 5.3. 
Anyway, as discussed in section 5.3 (points (2) and (3)), in most cases the 
impacts of ageing in reality may not be determined by the analysis of only few of 
such variables, but the exact parameter constellation of a relatively large 
parameter portfolio (see section 5.2) may be deciding. Therefore, the strength and 
direction of factor-allocation-effects of ageing may vary strongly across countries 
                                                 
13 Groezen et al. (2005)-focus is on trade-off between “savings effect” and “factor-allocation-
effect”, see section 1.3, while our focus is on detailed modeling of the “factor-allocation-effect”, 
see section 1.4. 
14 Let us take a very extreme example: The services of a psychologist seem to be very labour-
intensive. That is, it is very difficult to imagine today, that even in far future a machine will be 
invented, which is able to substitute the human psychologist (or its ability to understand the 
emotions of the patient). Thus, we may assume that labour-intensity in this profession 
(psychologist) will always be very high. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that psychology 
(as a science) will make some progress, and, thus, the productivity of the psychologist will 
increase, i.e. the TFP of psychological service provision will increase in future. 
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depending upon their values of these parameters. The fact that empirical studies 
were not able to identify an unambiguous effect of ageing on growth (see 
Groezen et al. (2005)) may come from the neglect of the importance of cross-
country differences in this parameter portfolio. 
The following result is related to this discussion as well: In contrast to the 
previous literature we show (in section 4.3.2) that the impacts of ageing on GDP-
growth may be non-monotonous over time, i.e. in the beginning ageing may have 
a positive (negative) impact on GDP-growth and later the effect of ageing may be 
negative (positive).15 This result, as well, implies that the strength of the ageing 
impact (and the necessary reforms of pension systems) may vary widely across 
countries and across time, depending on the parameters derived in our model. 
 
Last not least, we introduced the “price effect” in our paper (see also section 5.1 
point (3)). This effect is predominant in sections 4.2 and 4.3.2.2. In fact, it is the 
only “persistent” effect of a one-time increase in the old-to-young-ratio. Thus, this 
effect elucidates the theoretical importance of ageing for growth: even a one time-
increase in the old-to-young ratio is associated with a permanent change in the 
(equilibrium) growth rate of real GDP. 
 
Overall, our results imply that from the theoretical point of view factor-allocation-
effects of ageing have significant impacts on the long-run GDP-growth rate. 
Projections of future GDP-growth and of future pension-system-challenges may 
be too optimistic. For example, the paper by the Economic Policy Committee of 
the EU Commission (2003) based on Mc Morrow and Röger (2003) (see there 
especially pp. 12 ff.) does not include factor-allocation-effects in its ageing-
related projections. Hence, the negative impacts of ageing may be stronger than 
expected by now and the reforms of old-age-pension systems (and health-
systems) may be too weak. Furthermore, theories which try to explain the 
past/historic development of aggregates (e.g. Kaldor-facts) without accounting for 
factor-allocation-effects of ageing seem to omit important determinants of 
                                                 
15 This non-monotonousity comes from the fact that, although the senior sector has relatively low 
capital intensity, the price of senior-goods needs not necessarily being higher than the price of 
junior-goods. That is, the positive “price effect” of ageing can overweight the negative 
“productivity effects” of ageing. However, if the growth rate of labour-augmenting technological 
progress is relatively high in the junior sectors, the senior goods must become more expensive 
than junior goods at some point of time, i.e. the price effect becomes negative as well. (See also 
the explanations at the beginning of section 5.4 (second paragraph)). 
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aggregate development. In general, ageing causes unbalanced growth of sectors 
and aggregates in our model. 
 
5.5 The usefulness of PBGPs 
From a theoretical point of view our model demonstrates the usefulness of 
partially balanced growth paths in dynamic analysis: In contrast to most literature, 
which searches for balanced growth paths of variables of interest, we used a 
different approach: Although we are interested in the development of GDP and 
sectoral employment shares, we did not analyze the balanced growth paths of 
these variables, since these growth paths are not interesting from a theoretical 
point of view (because they do not allow for structural change). Instead, we 
analyzed our variables of interest along the balanced growth path of an auxiliary 
dynamic system, which consisted of variables Y, K and E. We named the 
balanced growth path of this auxiliary system “PBGP”. In section 4.2 we 
analyzed our variables of interest along the PBGP, while in section 4.3 we 
analyzed the transitional dynamics between two PBGPs and compared the PBGP-
dynamics of two equilibriums. Overall, the usage of PBGPs helped us to 
analytically study a topic which otherwise would require simulations. 
 
5.6 A word on challenges to pension-systems 
Needless to say that our paper has also implications for all the literature and 
predictions which deal with the challenges to old-age-pension and health-systems 
associated with ageing. If the ageing-induced change in GDP-growth is negative, 
there is additional upward-pressure on the pension-to-output ratio. (Remember 
that upward pressure on the pension-to-output-ratio comes from an increasing 
number of pension-recipients as well).  
 
5.7 Extension of our model: Endogenous technology 
The existence and strength of “factor-allocation-effects” of ageing depends upon 
the existence and strength of technology-bias. “Technology-bias” means here 
cross-sector-difference in technology: we assume that senior-goods-sectors do not 
use the same technology as junior-goods-sectors. If this bias vanished, i.e. if both 
sectors had the same technology, the factor allocation across the two sectors 
would be irrelevant regarding GDP-growth. Thus, there would not be any factor-
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allocation-effect of ageing. In the introduction of the paper we provided literature-
references which imply that the technology-bias exists in reality. In our model the 
technology(-bias) is exogenous; ageing has no impact on the technology-bias.  
Stijepic and Wagner (2011) provide an extension of our model, where the 
technology-bias is endogenized. They show that ageing-related demand-shifts can 
have an impact on the technology-bias (see section 5 in that paper). Nevertheless, 
their results do not imply that any of our results is incorrect. However, their 
results imply that additional forces have an impact on the strength of the factor-
allocation-effects of ageing: in fact, all the forces which influence the technology-
bias (e.g. sort of implementation of technological progress, dispersion of capital 
across sectors, etc) have also an impact on the factor-allocation-effects of ageing 
discussed in this essay. Note, however, that all these forces determine the strength 
of the factor-allocation-effects of ageing, but not the direction. An extensive 
discussion of these forces is provided by Stijepic and Wagner (2011). 
 
5.8 Caveats and topics for further research 
Throughout the paper we assumed that parameter restrictions (5a,b) hold. In fact, 
these restrictions ensure that there are no other sources of demand-shifts between 
the senior and junior sector beside of ageing. However, the impact of social 
welfare parameters (especially, the question how the utility of the old and the 
young is weighted in a society) may be captured by deviation from these 
restrictions. The question is whether pension systems (and private “savings-for-
retirement”-behaviour) change systematically (i.e. whether the weight is shifted to 
the old or to the young) with an increasing income. The answer to this question 
decides whether the budget-share of the old increases/decreases over the growth 
process. The higher the budget for senior-goods consumption (per old person), the 
stronger the factor-allocation-effects of ageing. Income-dependent changes in 
pension-systems could be modelled by a departure from the restrictions (5a,b). 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned here that, if the budget of the old ( SE ) was 
restricted by an exogenous force (e.g. by an “inefficient” pension system) in our 
model, the ageing impacts on GDP-growth would be weaker. However, from the 
social welfare point of view this would be suboptimal (i.e. the social welfare 
would be suboptimal). 
 44
These facts may as well have some explanatory power regarding differences in 
the strength of ageing impacts across countries. 
In section 4.3 we modelled ageing like a shock (or series of shocks) and not like a 
smooth and perfectly foresighted process. The difference between these two 
approaches is that the latter is more difficult to model (We could not rely on the 
PBGP-results) and we would have to use simulations. Furthermore, if perfectly 
foresighted the effects of ageing would be smoother, i.e. dispersed over a longer 
period (i.e. even before the increase in the old-to-young ratio the effects of ageing 
would show up), which would affect our results quantitatively but not 
qualitatively (i.e. the impact channels would be the same). Furthermore, it should 
be questioned whether it makes sense to model ageing like a smooth perfectly 
foresighted process, especially when taking into account irrational or bounded 
rational behaviour of households in reality. Last but not least, since our model is 
aimed to postulate some crude qualitative relationships between macroeconomic 
parameters and variables, the question whether ageing is modelled as a series of 
shocks or as a perfectly foresighted smooth process seems to be less relevant. 
Overall, our results imply that for assessing (the future) growth-impacts of ageing 
some further empirical research is necessary to estimate the exact technological 
properties of the junior and senior sector. Especially, it seems to be necessary to 
link the data on demand-differences across the old and the young with the data on 
technological properties of the sectors. Only in this way a general conclusion can 
be drawn about the past and future strength of the ageing impacts. Furthermore, 
the question whether the senior sector will have a lower growth rate of labour-
augmenting technological progress in future seems to be interesting regarding the 
effects of ageing. 
Last not least, as mentioned in Section 2.1, it could be interesting to endogenize 
the population development (e.g. old-to-young ratio as a function of income) and 
to analyze which factor-allocation-effects arise in such a model. However, the 
results of such an exercise are approximated by standard structural change 
literature, as discussed in Section 2.1. 
Analyzing these questions is left for further research. 
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APPENDIX A 
Inserting equations (7) and (8) into equation (21) yields: 
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Inserting equations (A.1) and (A.2) into equation (7) yields 
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Inserting equations (A.3) and (A.4) into equation (21) yields: 
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Inserting equation (A.7) into equation (18) yields: 
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Inserting equations (A.7), (A.5) and (A.6) into equation (13) yields: 
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Inserting equations (A.3) and (A.5) into equation (21) yields for mi =  
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Solving this equation for H yields: 
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Inserting equation (A.9) into equation (A.10) yields 
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Inserting equations (A.1) and (A.2) into equation (14) yields (remember: it 
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It follows from equations (1)-(6) and (22) that 
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Inserting equations (A.15), (A.5) and (A.6) into equation (17) yields 
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Inserting equations (2)-(6) and (A.3) into equation (23) yields due to equation 
(A.16): 
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Inserting equation (A.13) into equation (A.18) yields: 
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Inserting first equation (A.14) and then equation (A.13) into equation (A.11) 
yields: 
(A.20) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=
m
m
mm k
lddALH 21
γβζκγ  
where 
χβ
αν
χγ
αμ
−
−
−≡
1
1
11d  and 
χβ
αν
χγ
αμ
−
−
≡
1
1
2d . 
It follows from equation (A.4) that  
(A.21) μν ζϑκ mm
i
i BL
Yl =  for nmi ,...1+= . 
Inserting first equation (11), then equations (A.15) and (A.6) and finally equation 
(A.19) into equation (A.21) yields 
(A.22) 
Y
ph
BLY
C
N
LNl ii
mm
imm
m
i
i ~~ α
χ
ζϑκ
θθ
ω
ω
α
χ
μν ++
−−=  for nmi ,...1+=  
where 
m
m
k
lba
YY
+
≡~ . 
It follows from equation (A.13) that 
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Inserting first equation (A.22), then equations (A.16) and (A.7) and finally 
equation (A.8) into equation (A.23) yields after some algebra (remember that 
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Equations (11), (12), (16a), (17), (18) and (15a) imply: 
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Inserting equation (A.12) into equation (A.17) yields 
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Equations (A.24)-(A.28) can be transformed into equations (24), (25), 
(26a,b,d) and (26c). Q.E.D.  
Now we only have to derive equation (27). By using equations (14), (15c), (16a), 
(A.5) and (A.6) equation (15b) can be transformed as follows: 
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where Sp  is given by equation (A.6). Now, inserting equations (A.2), (A.4) and 
(A.6) yields: 
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where Sl  is given by equation (19). Inserting equations (16b), (A.14), (A.19) and 
(A.20) yields 
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inserting equations (26a,b) and (A.23) yields 
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where Sp  is given by equation (A.6). Inserting equation (A.12) into (A.6) yields 
after some algebra:  
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(Hint: the following equations may be useful for obtaining (A.30): 1=++ γβα  
and 1=++ μνχ ; these equations imply among others that 
ανβχβμγννβ −=−+−  and μαγχγνμβμγ −=−+− .) 
The rest of the proof is quite simple: equation (27) can be obtained by 
dividing the net-output (equation (26b)) by the price-index (equation (A.29)), 
where Sp  is given by equation (A.30). Q.E.D.  
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APPENDIX B 
Equations (A.7), (A.8), (A.16) and (A.22) from APPENDIX A and equations 
(5a,b) and (19) imply equation (29). 
Equation (28) can be derived in the same way as equation (29). 
Equations (A.5), (A.6), (A.15a,b), (A.16) from APPENDIX A and equations 
(5a,b) and (20) imply equations (30) and (31). 
For a proof of equations (32) and (33) see APPENDIX A equations (A.1) and 
(A.2). 
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APPENDIX C 
First, we show by using linear approximation that the saddle-path-feature of the 
PBGP is given (Lemma 7a). Then we prove local stability by using a phase 
diagram (Lemma 7b). 
 
 
Existence of a saddle-path (Lemma 7a) 
The study of local stability of the PBGP is analogous to the proof by Acemoglu 
and Guerrieri (2008) (see there for details and see also Acemoglu (2009), pp. 269-
273, 926). 
First, we have to show that the determinant of the Jacobian of the differential 
equation system (24)-(25) (where mλ  is given by equation (26c)) is different from 
zero when evaluated at the PBGP (i.e. for *** ,ˆ,ˆ mEK λ  from equations (35a,b,e)). 
This implies that this differential equation system is hyperbolic and can be 
linearly approximated around *** ,ˆ,ˆ mEK λ  (Grobman-Hartman-Theorem; see as 
well Acemoglu (2009), p. 926, and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008)). The 
determinant of the Jacobian is given by: 
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The derivatives of equations (24)-(25) are given by: 
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where the derivatives of equation (26c) are given by  
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Inserting the derivatives (C.2) and (C.3) into (C.1) and inserting the PBGP-values 
from equations (35a,b,e) yields after some algebra the following value of the 
determinant of the Jacobian evaluated at the PBGP: 
(C.4) 
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We can see that the determinant evaluated at PBGP is different form zero. Hence, 
the PBGP is hyperbolic. Furthermore, we can be sure that 0* <J , provided that 
0>−ανχβ . Since we assume in our paper that the capital intensity in the 
senior-sector is lower in comparison to the junior sector, the relation 0>−ανχβ  
holds (see section 4.3).  
Our differential equation system consists of two differential equations ((24) and 
(25)) and of two variables ( Eˆ  and Kˆ ), where we have one state and one control-
variable. Hence, saddle-path-stability of the PBGP requires that there exist one 
negative (and one positive) eigenvalue of the differential equation system when 
evaluated at PBGP (see also Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) and Acemoglu 
(2009), pp. 269-273). Since 0* <J  we can be sure that this is the case. ( 0* <J  
can exist only if one eigenvalue is positive and the other eigenvalue is negative. If 
both eigenvalues were negative or if both eigenvalues were positive, the 
determinant *J  would be positive.) Therefore, in the neighborhood of the PBGP 
there is a saddle-path along which the economy converges to the PBGP. Q.E.D. 
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Local stability (Lemma 7b) 
In the following, we omit intermediates for simplicity, i.e. we set 0== μγ . 
Furthermore, as noted above we study here only the case 0>−ανχβ  (see also 
section 4.3). Since αχανχβ −=−  if 0== μγ , we can say as well that we 
study here only the case 0>−αχ . Note, however, that the qualitative stability 
results for the other case (i.e. 0<−αχ ) are the same. 
To show the stability-features of the PBGP, the three-dimensional system (C.1)-
(C.3) has to be transformed into a two dimensional system, in order to allow me 
using a phase-diagram. By defining the variable 
m
K
λκ
ˆ≡ , the system (24)-(25)-
(26c) can be reformulated as follows (after some algebra): 
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We can focus attention on showing that the stationary point of this differential 
equation system is stable: The discussion in section 4.1 (Definition 3 and Lemmas 
1-4) implies that κ  and Eˆ  are jointly in steady state only if Kˆ , Eˆ  and mλ  are 
jointly in steady state and that Kˆ , Eˆ  and mλ  are jointly in steady state only if κ  
and Eˆ  are jointly in steady state. Therefore, the proof of stability of the stationary 
point of system (C.5)-(C.6) implies stability of the stationary point of system 
(24)-(25)-(26c). Hence, in the following we will prove stability of the stationary 
point of system (C.5)-(C.6). 
It follows from equations (C.5) and (C.6) that the steady-state-loci of the two 
variables are given by 
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Now, we could depict the differential equation system (C.5)-(C.6) in the phase 
space ( κ,Eˆ ). Before doing so, we show that not the whole phase space ( κ,Eˆ ) is 
economically meaningful. The economically meaningful phase-space is restricted 
by three curves ( 321 ,, tt RRR ), as shown in the following figure and as derived 
below: 
 
Figure C.1: Relevant space of the phase diagram 
 
Only the space below the 1R -line is economically meaningful, since the 
employment-share of at least one sub-sector i is negative in the space above the 
1R -line. This can be seen from the following fact: 
As shown in APPENDIX A (see there equation (A.23)), the following relation is 
true 
(C.7) ∑
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1 χβ
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Note that αχανχβ −=−  when 0== μγ . 
κ
Eˆ  
1R  
3
0=tR  
2
0=tR  
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Since, il  cannot be negative (hence , 10
1
≤≤ ∑
+=
n
mi
il ) this equation implies that 
(C.8) χβ
αν<
m
m
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l  
Inserting equation (26c) into this relation yields 
(C.9) βκχ
α
LN
NER −<
ˆ:1   (remember that 0== μγ ). 
Hence, the space above 1R  is not feasible. When the economy reaches a point on 
1R , no labour is used in sub-sectors i=1,…m. If we impose Inada-conditions on 
the production functions, as usual, this means that the output of sub-sectors 
i=1,…m is equal to zero, which means that the consumption of these sectors is 
equal to zero. Our utility function implies that life-time utility is infinitely 
negative in this case. Hence, the household prefers not to be at the 1R -curve. 
Now we turn to the 2tR  and 
3
tR -curves. We have to take account of the non-
negativity-constraints on consumption ( iCi ∀> 0 ), since our Stone-Geary-type 
utility function can give rise to negative consumption. By using equations (A.6), 
(A.15) and (A.16) from APPENDIX A and Definition 1 the non-negativity-
constraints ( iCi ∀> 0 ) can be transformed as follows (remember that we assume 
here 0== μγ ):  
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This set of constraints implies that at any point of time only two constraints are 
binding, namely those with respectively the largest 
i
i
ω
θ− . Hence, the set (C.10), 
(C.11) can be reduced to the following set: 
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and mj ≤≤1 . 
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These constraints are time-dependent. It depends upon the parameter setting 
whether 2tR  or whether 
3
tR  is binding at a point of time. In Figure C.1 we have 
depicted examples for these constraints for the initial state of the system. Only the 
space above the constraints is economically meaningful, since below the 
constraints the consumption of at least one good is negative. Last not least, note 
that equations (C.12)/(C.13) imply that the 2tR -curve and the 
3
tR -curve converge 
to the axes of the phase-diagram as time approaches infinity.  
Now, we depict the differential equation system (C.5)-(C.6) in the phase space 
( κ,Eˆ ). 
 
Figure C.2: The differential equation system (C.5)-(C.6) in the phase-space for 
0>−=− αχανχβ  
 
Note that we have depicted here only the relevant (or: binding) parts of the 
restriction-set of Figure C.1 as a bold line R. 
κ
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*κ
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0ˆ =E&  
S 
saddle-path 
κ0κ  
R 
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The phase diagram implies that there must be a saddle-path along which the 
system converges to the stationary point S (where S is actually the PBGP). The 
length of the saddle-path is restricted by the restrictions of the meaningful space 
321 ,, tt RRR  (bold line). In other words, only if the initial κ  ( 0κ ) is somewhere 
between 0κ  and κ , the economy can be on the saddle-path. Therefore, the 
system can be only locally saddle-path stable. Now, we have to show that the 
system will be on the saddle-path if κκκ << 00 . Furthermore, we have to discuss 
what happens if 0κ  is not within this range. 
All trajectories which start above the saddle-path or left from 0κ  reach the 1R -
curve in finite time. As discussed above, the life-time utility becomes infinitely 
negative if the household reaches the 1R -curve. These arguments imply that the 
representative household will never choose to start above the saddle path if 
κκκ << 00 , since all the trajectories above the saddle-path lead to a state where 
life-time-utility is infinitely negative. 
Furthermore, all initial points which are situated below the saddle-path or right 
from κ  converge to the point T. If the system reaches one of the constraints 
( 32 , tt RR ) during this convergence process, it moves along the binding constraint 
towards T. However, the transversality condition is violated in T. Therefore, T is 
not an equilibrium. To see that the transversality condition is violated in T 
consider the following facts: The transversality condition in our model requires 
that 0
1
lim 1 >−−−−
−
∞→ βδβκ
β G
Lt
gg , which is equivalent to: 
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. However, equation (C.6a) implies that in point T in 
Figure C.2 
β
βδ
κ
−
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
−++
=
1
1
1
1
G
L
gg
. Hence, the transversality condition is 
violated if the system converges to point T. 
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Overall, we know that, if κκκ << 00 , the household always decides to be on the 
saddle-path. Hence, we know that for κκκ << 00  the economy converges to the 
PBGP. In this sense, the PBGP is locally stable (within the range κκκ << 00 ). 
If the initial capital is to small ( 00 κκ < ), the economy converges to a state 
where some existence minima are not satisfied (curve 1R ) and, thus, utility 
becomes infinitely negative. This may be interpreted as a development trap. On 
the other hand, if initial capital-level is too large ( κκ >0 ), all trajectories violate 
the transversality condition. Therefore, in this case, the representative 
household must waste a part of its initial capital to come into the feasible area 
( κκκ << 00 ).  
Q.E.D. 
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APPENDIX D 
Due to equation (16c) we know that 
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Equation (38) can be obtained by inserting equation (A.29) from APPENDIX A 
and equation (35d) into equation (D.1). Hints: Equation (A.30) from APPENDIX 
A and equation (35a) imply that 0
*
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pS . Furthermore, we used equation 
(A.23) to transform *mλ  into *Sl . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
